Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 15, 2024, 7:35pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 1:15pm ET on May 15. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the May 16 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The tempo of Russian
offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast continues to decrease
after Russian forces initially seized areas that Ukrainian officials
have now confirmed were less defended. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian military officials stated that
Ukrainian forces have partially stabilized the situation in northern
Kharkiv Oblast bordering Russia.[1] Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces
Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Russian
forces are attempting to make tactical gains near Lukyantsi and
Vovchansk to create footholds for future advances, but that Ukrainian
counterattacks and artillery and drone strikes are preventing Russian
forces from gaining a foothold in these areas.[2] Kharkiv Oblast
Administration officials stated on May 15 that constant Russian shelling
makes it impossible for Ukrainian forces to establish fortifications
within three to five kilometers of the international border in Kharkiv
Oblast and that Ukrainian forces constructed the first and second lines
of defense about 12 to 13 kilometers and 20 kilometers from the
international border, respectively.[3] ISW currently assesses that
Russian forces have advanced no more than eight kilometers from the
international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces
operating in Russia could easily conduct artillery strikes against
Ukrainian defensive positions close to the international border, and
Western prohibitions on the use of Western-provided weapons systems for
strikes against rear Russian areas across the border make potential
fixed Ukrainian defensive positions close to the international border
vulnerable and possibly indefensible. Russian forces have been able to
make tactical advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast since May 10 in areas
where Ukrainian forces purposefully did not establish significant
defensive lines and currently appear to be prioritizing the creation of a
"buffer zone" over a deep penetration into Kharkiv Oblast.[4]
The
US Helsinki Commission stated that the US should allow Ukraine to
conduct strikes against military targets in Russia's border areas amid
an ongoing Russian offensive operation into Kharkiv Oblast from Russia,
although US officials continue to express unwillingness to support such
strikes. The US Helsinki Commission stated on May 15 that the
US should "not only allow but encourage" Ukrainian forces to strike
Russian forces firing and staging in Russia's border areas as part of
Russia's offensive operations into northern Kharkiv Oblast.[5] US
Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated earlier on May 15 that the US
has not "encouraged or enabled" Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory
but noted that Ukraine must decide how to conduct this war.[6] Politico
reported on May 14, citing two unnamed US officials, that the Biden
Administration's policy prohibiting Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons
to strike Russian territory has not changed.[7] Politico's
sources stated that US military assistance to Ukraine is "for the
defense and not for offensive operations" into Russian territory. A
Ukrainian operation to strike systems in Russia that are directly
supporting Russia's offensive ground operations in northern Kharkiv
Oblast would be an inherently defensive effort and to characterize such
an effort as "offensive" would be inaccurate. ISW recently
assessed that US limitations on Ukraine's ability to strike military
targets in Russia have created a sanctuary in Russia's border areas from
which Russian aircraft can conduct glide bomb and missile strikes
against Ukrainian positions and settlements and where Russian forces and
equipment can freely assemble before entering combat.[8] This US policy
is severely compromising Ukraine's ability to defend itself against
Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[9]
Russian
President Vladimir Putin emphatically downplayed the threat of
Ukrainian counterattacks along the entire frontline, further indicating
that he assesses that Ukraine cannot and will not be able to liberate
territory seized by Russian forces and that this will allow Russian
forces to pursue creeping advances indefinitely. Putin stated
on May 15 in a meeting with Russia's military district commanders that
Russian forces are repelling all Ukrainian counterattacks and that
Russian forces are constantly improving their positions in all
directions in Ukraine.[10] The US Office of the Director of National
Intelligence's (ODNI) 2024 Annual Threat Assessment reported that
Russian President Vladimir Putin "probably believes" that Russian forces
have blunted Ukrainian efforts to retake significant territory and that
US and Western support for Ukraine is "finite."[11] Limited Russian
offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast suggest that Putin and
the Russian military command may be evaluating the risks, prospects, and
timeline of offensive operations based on the assumption that Russian
forces will be able to advance in any area of the front and consolidate
any gains without having to account for Ukrainian tactical
counterattacks or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation in
the future.[12]
Putin likely has made this assumption
based on months of gradual grains throughout eastern Ukraine, but this
calculus fundamentally misjudges the tactical capabilities that
Ukrainian forces will have once US security assistance begins to arrive
to the front at scale. The New York Times reported on May 15
that US officials have expressed confidence that the arrival of US
security assistance to Ukrainian forces at scale by July 2024 will
likely allow Ukrainian forces to reverse many of the tactical gains that
Russian forces have achieved in recent weeks.[13] US officials were
reportedly hesitant to discuss how US security assistance may facilitate
Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2025, however.[14] It is
imperative for Ukrainian forces to be able to pursue large-scale
counteroffensive operations that liberate Russian-occupied territory as
soon as conditions permit, otherwise Putin will likely continue to
believe that he can pursue grinding offensive operations indefinitely
and force Ukraine into the strategic defense until achieving
victory.[15]
Russian President Vladimir Putin
continues to publicly prioritize the further mobilization of the Russian
defense industrial base (DIB) while also attempting to assuage possible domestic fears about the negative effects of increased Russian defense spending.
Putin met with the commanders of the Russian military districts and
with officials involved in the Russian DIB on May 15 and focused both
meetings on the need to develop the Russian DIB and economy.[16] Putin
appointed Russian Presidential Aide Alexei Dyumin and Minister of
Industry and Trade Anton Alikhanov to the supervisory board of
state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec and specifically tasked Dyumin
with assisting Russian efforts to provide the Russian military with the
necessary weapons and equipment.[17] Putin stated that Russia's
"cumulative defense and security spending" in 2024 will be about 8.7
percent (likely referring to defense spending as percentage of GDP), but
noted that although this amount is significant, it is much less than
Soviet defense spending in the mid-1980s of about 13 percent.[18]
Russian business journalists estimated in November 2023 that Russian
authorities planned to spend about 39 percent of the 2024 federal budget
on defense and law enforcement, and Reuters reported in
October 2023 that the 2024 Russian federal budget would allocate 29.4
percent to national defense.[19] Putin attempted to downplay the
negative effects of increased defense spending on civilians' lives while
also claiming that increased defense spending will boost the civilian
sector of the economy. Putin stated that even as Russian defense
spending grows, the Russian state must fulfill all its social
obligations to Russian citizens and develop Russian social spheres, such
as education, healthcare, support for veterans, and pensions. Putin
claimed that increased Russian defense spending is connected to various
civilian production sectors and boosts overall industrial development
and job creation. Putin's continued focus on social spending indicates
that Putin remains concerned about Russian domestic opinion and is
unwilling to rapidly put the Russian economy on a full wartime footing
in a way that generates fundamental economic disruption.
Putin specifically noted that the Russian DIB must increase the quality of Russian weapons. Putin
stated that "whoever masters the latest means of armed struggle faster,
wins" and called for the Russian defense industry to "double, triple"
production and create more effective, accurate, and powerful weapons in
order to decrease Russian losses.[20] Putin's focus on how technology
can facilitate victory is likely a response to Ukrainian officials'
recent discussions about how Ukraine needs to innovate technologically
in order to beat a numerically superior Russian force.[21] Putin's
emphasis on producing higher quality weapons is likely a direct response
to Ukraine's higher-quality Western weapons and equipment. Ukrainian
officials have noted recently that although Russian artillery supplies
have greatly outnumbered those of Ukrainian forces, Ukrainian artillery
is more precise than Russian artillery.[22] Although Russian forces have
been able to exploit under-provisioned Ukrainian forces and make
tactically significant advances along several sectors of the front
recently, Russian forces have been unable to make operationally
significant gains with their numerical manpower and materiel advantages
alone.[23] Putin has consistently indicated that he is unwilling to
transfer Russia to a full wartime economy, and a Russian DIB on a full
wartime footing would likely still suffer from limiting factors, such as
continued labor shortages in Russian defense industrial enterprises and
the lack of the domestically produced goods required for advanced
systems, and would likely not be able to produce the quantity of all
types of weapons and equipment required to sustain Russian operations in
Ukraine for years.[24]
Putin is likely concerned about the economic and diplomatic implications of decreased Russian arms exports.
Putin thanked former Defense Minister and current Russian Security
Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu for reshaping the Russian military in
recent years and claimed that no one, including Russia, understood the
"modern methods of conducting armed struggle" before Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine — a likely attempt to soften the blow of Shoigu's
de facto demotion. Putin stated that Shoigu will work with the
Military-Industrial Complex Commission under the Presidential
Administration as well as the Federal Service for Cooperation with
Foreign Countries.[25] Putin stated that Russia must ensure its
contractual obligations to supply weapons and military equipment to
foreign countries but noted that the Russian military's needs are the
first priority. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) reported in March 2024 that Russia exported major arms to 31
countries in 2019 and only 12 in 2023 with Russian arms exports falling
by 53 percent between 2014-2018 and 2019-2023.[26] Putin's renewed
emphasis on arms exports is likely due to concerns about how the
continued loss of federal budget revenue from arms exports will affect
the Russian government's ability to sustain or even increase defense
spending. Putin's statement about arms exports also suggests that Putin
is concerned with how Russia's inability to fulfill arms export
contracts since the start of the war in Ukraine has negatively affected
Russia's bilateral relations, particularly with non-Western countries
with which Russia is trying to curry favor in hopes that these countries
will join Russia's imagined wide coalition opposing the collective
West. Russia, for example, reportedly delayed the delivery of air
defense systems to India, and Indian government sources have previously
stated that India wants to distance itself from Russia because the war
in Ukraine has limited Russia's ability to provide India with
munitions.[27]
The Kremlin confirmed the
appointments of the newly formed Moscow and Leningrad military districts
(MMD and LMD) and other military district commanders on May 15.
Putin met with the Russian military district commanders and senior
Russian defense officials on May 15 thereby confirming that former
Russian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin became
LMD commander and former Southern Military District (SMD) Colonel
General Sergei Kuzovlev became MMD commander.[28] The Kremlin meeting
also confirmed that Lieutenant General Alexander Sanchik replaced
Colonel General Sergei Kuzmenko as acting Eastern Military District
(EMD) commander, that Colonel General Gennady Anashkin replaced Kuzovlev
as acting Southern Military District (SMD) commander, and that Colonel
General Andrey Mordvichev will remain Central Military District (CMD)
commander.[29] A Russian insider source, who has routinely been accurate
about past Russian military command changes, correctly reported on
these command changes in early May.[30] ISW has routinely observed that
Putin regularly rotates officials and military commanders in and out of
favor with the aim of incentivizing different factions to strive to
accomplish his objectives and continues to assess that the Kremlin may
have decided to change the leadership of the military districts in
preparation for its expected summer offensive effort, which is
forecasted to begin in late May or in June.[31]
Russian
sources speculated that the May 13 detention of Russian Deputy Defense
Minister Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov is only the beginning of a
wider effort to root out corruption within the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed
on May 15 that Kuznetsov's detention and the April 24 detention of
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov on charges of accepting
bribes prompted rumors that Russian authorities may arrest other
unspecified corrupt officials serving in the Russian MoD's Main
Operational-Mobilization Directorate, Main Directorate of Combat
Training, and other high-level directorates.[32] The milblogger noted
that bribery schemes have been incredibly common and pervasive in Russia
over the last 15 years and that Russian authorities may limit their
efforts to corruption cases that have caused tangible issues with
Russian forces' combat effectiveness or operational security. Several
Russian milbloggers lamented the pervasiveness of corruption and
ineptitude among the Russian high command, and one Russian milblogger
called on the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Investigative
Committee to "shake out" all of the corrupt officials within the Russian
MoD.[33]
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken
announced during a joint press conference with Ukrainian Foreign
Minister Dmytro Kuleba on May 15 that the US will provide a two billion
dollar "defense enterprise fund" to Ukraine.[34] Blinken stated
that the fund has three components: assisting Ukraine in acquiring
needed weapons, investing in Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB),
and helping Ukraine purchase military equipment and weapons from the US
and other countries.
Ukraine's Main Military
Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly struck a Russian fuel depot in
Rostov Oblast on the night of May 14 to 15.[35] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported
that its sources stated that GUR attacked a fuel depot in Proletarsky
Raion, Rostov Oblast with drones and that a fire broke out at the
facility.[36] Suspilne's sources added that Russian forces used
the fuel depot for military purposes.[37] Rostov Oblast Governor Vasyl
Golubev stated that two Ukrainian drones caused explosions at the
facility but denied that there was a fire at the facility.[38]
The
Kremlin continues to add European officials to Russia's wanted list as
part of Russia's efforts to assert the jurisdiction of Russian federal
law over sovereign NATO member states. Russian opposition outlet Mediazona
published an updated review of the Russian Ministry of Internal
Affairs' (MVD) wanted list on May 15 and noted that the Russian MVD
added several dozen more Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Czech, and
Polish officials to the wanted list since February 2024.[39] Mediazona
reported that there are currently 88 Latvian and 66 Lithuanian
politicians from various government levels; five Polish mayors; an
unspecified number of former and current council members of several
Czech municipalities; and four current and former Estonian officials,
including current Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas and Minister of
Internal Affairs Lauri Laanemets, on Russia's wanted list. Mediazona
noted that the Russian MVD also recently added and removed Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky and former Ukrainian President Petro
Poroshenko, as ISW previously reported.[40] ISW continues to assess that
the Kremlin's efforts to assert the jurisdiction of Russian law in
sovereign European states are intended to set information conditions
justifying possible future Russian aggression against NATO.[41]
Key Takeaways:
- The
tempo of Russian offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast
continues to decrease after Russian forces initially seized areas that
Ukrainian officials have now confirmed were less defended.
- The
US Helsinki Commission stated that the US should allow Ukraine to
conduct strikes against military targets in Russia's border areas amid
an ongoing Russian offensive operation into Kharkiv Oblast from Russia,
although US officials continue to express unwillingness to support such
strikes.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin
continues to publicly prioritize the further mobilization of the Russian
defense industrial base (DIB) while also attempting to assuage possible domestic fears about the negative effects of increased Russian defense spending.
- Putin specifically noted that the Russian DIB must increase the quality of Russian weapons.
- Putin is likely concerned about the economic and diplomatic implications of decreased Russian arms exports.
- The
Kremlin confirmed the appointments of the newly formed Moscow and
Leningrad military districts (MMD and LMD) and other military district
commanders on May 15.
- Russian sources
speculated that the May 13 detention of Russian Deputy Defense Minister
Lieutenant General Yuri Kuznetsov is only the beginning of a wider
effort to root out corruption within the Russian Ministry of Defense
(MoD).
- US Secretary of State Antony Blinken
announced during a joint press conference with Ukrainian Foreign
Minister Dmytro Kuleba on May 15 that the US will provide a two billion
dollar "defense enterprise fund" to Ukraine.
- Ukraine's
Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly struck a
Russian fuel depot in Rostov Oblast on the night of May 14 to 15.
- The
Kremlin continues to add European officials to Russia's wanted list as
part of Russia's efforts to assert the jurisdiction of Russian federal
law over sovereign NATO member states.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances in northern Kharkiv Oblast, near Siversk, and west of Donetsk City.
- Ukrainian
National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Lytyvyenko
assessed on May 15 that Russian forces will have enough tanks and
armored fighting vehicles for the next year and half of fighting in
Ukraine at their current operational tempo.
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City)
NOTE: ISW is adding a
section to cover Russian offensive operations along the Belgorod-Kharkiv
axis as these offensive operations comprise an operational effort
separate from Russian offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. ISW may enlarge the scope of this
section should Russian forces expand offensive operations along the
Russian-Ukrainian international border in northeastern Ukraine.|
Russian
forces continued to make tactical advances in the Lyptsi direction
(north of Kharkiv City) as of May 15. Geolocated footage published on
May 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Hlyboke
(north of Lyptsi) and along the east bank of the Travyanske Reservoir
(northwest of Lyptsi).[42] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Hlyboke and
Lukyantsi (northeast of Lyptsi).[43] Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian elements of the 18th Motorized
Rifle Division (11th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District [LMD])
seized Lukyantsi on March 13 and that Ukrainian forces recently pushed
Russian forces out of Zelene (northeast of Lyptsi).[44] Lyptsi Village
Military Administration Head Serhiy Kryvetchenko stated Russian forces
have entered Lukyantsi.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that
Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults between Borysivka (northeast
of Lyptsi) and Neskuchne (northeast of Lyptsi).[46]
Russian
forces recently made further tactical advances near Vovchansk
(northeast of Kharkiv City). Geolocated footage published on May 14
indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Starytsya
(southwest of Vovchansk).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian
forces seized Starytsya, while others claimed that fighting continued in
the settlement.[48] Ukrainian MoD Spokesperson Dmytro Lazutkin stated
that Russian forces entered Vovchansk and that small Russian infantry
groups are trying to gain a foothold in the northern part of
Vovchansk.[49] Vovchansk City Military Administration Head Tamaz
Gambarashvili stated that small arms battles are ongoing on the northern
outskirts of Vovchansk and that small Russian sabotage and
reconnaissance groups are trying to establish positions within the
settlement.[50] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi
also stated that Ukrainian forces moved to more advantageous positions
in unspecified areas near Vovchansk to save the lives of Ukrainian
personnel.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced
within Vovchansk and continued ground attacks southwest of Vovchansk
near Izbitske and Buhruvatka.[52]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian
forces continued offensive operations along the
Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on May 15, but there were no confirmed
changes to the frontline in this area. Russian forces continued ground
assaults northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Petropavlivka;
southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Kotlyarivka, Ivanivka, Berestove,
Krokhmalne, and Stelmakhivka; west of Svatove near Miasozharivka;
southwest of Svatove near Novoyehorivka and Tverdokhlibove; northwest of
Kreminna near Makiivka, Novosadove, and Terny.[53] A Russian milblogger
claimed that Russian forces advanced from Kolomyichykha towards
Andriivka (both west of Svatove), but ISW has not observed visual
confirmation of this claim.[54] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian
forces with armored vehicle support initially advanced to the northern
outskirts of Kyslivka (southeast of Kupyansk), but that Russian forces
later repelled the assault.[55] Elements of the Russian 47th Tank
Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District) are reportedly
operating near Kyslivka.[56]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Siversk direction
(northeast of Bakhmut) amid continued Russian assaults in the area on
May 15. Geolocated footage published on May 14 indicates that Ukrainian
forces recently marginally advanced in a forest area between Vesele and
Spirne (both southeast of Siversk).[57] Russian forces continued ground
assaults east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, southeast of Siversk
near Ivano-Darivka and Spirne, and south of Siversk near Rozdolivka.[58]
Elements of the Russian "Alexander Nevsky" Brigade are reportedly
operating near Soledar (north of Bakhmut).[59]
Russian
forces continued ground assaults near Chasiv Yar on May 15, but there
were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed
that Russian forces advanced into Kalynivka (just north of Chasiv Yar)
from the southeast and gained a foothold in the settlement.[60] The
milblogger claimed that most of eastern Kalynivka is a contested "gray
zone" that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control. ISW has not
observed visual confirmation of these Russian claims. Several Russian
milbloggers denied claims that Ukrainian forces transferred elements of
three brigades from Chasiv Yar to the Kharkiv direction and called such
claims "deliberate misinformation."[61] Russian forces continued
assaults northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; in the Novyi
Microraion in eastern Chasiv Yar; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske;
southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, and Kurdyumivka;
and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora.[62] Elements of the Russian 98th
Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar
direction.[63]
Russian
forces reportedly advanced near Avdiivka on May 15, but there were no
confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that
Russian forces seized Umanske (west of Avdiivka) and advanced near
Netaylove, Nevelske, and south of Pervomaiske (all southwest of
Avdiivka).[64] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of Russian
forces operating in western Umanske nor of further Russian advances near
Netaylove, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske. One Russian milblogger noted that
the pace of Russian offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction has
significantly slowed in recent days.[65] Russian forces continued
assaults northwest of Avdiivka near Kalynove, Novooleksandrivka, Sokil,
Yevhenivka, Soloyove, Novoselivka Persha, and Novopokrovske and west of
Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka.[66] Elements of the Russian 74th Motorized
Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District
[CMD]) are reportedly operating near Berdychi (northwest of
Avdiivka).[67]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued
fighting west and southwest of the city on May 15. Geolocated footage
published on May 15 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally
advanced within Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[68] Ukrainian
sources stated that Russian forces recently conducted a roughly
reinforced company sized mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka
(southwest of Donetsk City) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed four
Russian tanks and six infantry fighting vehicles during the Russian
assault.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to
the southern outskirts of Paraskoviivka (southwest of Donetsk
City).[70] Russian forces also continued assaults west of Donetsk City
near Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Vodyane and
Kostyantynivka.[71] Elements of the "Russkiye Yastreby" (Russian Hawks)
Detachment and the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's
Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near
Krasnohorivka.[72]
Russian
forces recently marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast
border area amid continued fighting in the area on May 15. Geolocated
footage published on May 15 indicates that Russian forces recently
marginally advanced within Urozhaine (south of Velyka Novosilka).[73]
Russian forces continued assaults south of Velyka Novosilka near
Staromayorske.[74] Elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade
(Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly
operating near Urozhaine.[75]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces
completely seized Robotyne on May 15, but there were no confirmed
advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[76] Ukraine's Southern
Operational Command and Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro
Pletenchuk stated that Russian claims about the seizure of Robotyne are
untrue.[77] One Russian milblogger initially claimed that Russian forces
seized a stronghold in northern Robotyne and suggested that Russian
forces seized the settlement.[78] The milblogger later claimed, however,
that elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd
Motorized Rifle Brigade, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern
Military District) that are reportedly operating within Robotyne claimed
that Ukrainian forces are still present in northern Robotyne and that
it is not clear if Russian forces have consolidated positions in eastern
Robotyne.[79] Other Russian milbloggers also expressed doubt about the
Russian MoD's claim.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces
advanced northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne) and south of
Hulyaipole (east of Orikhiv), but ISW has not observed visual
confirmation of these claims.[81] Russian forces continued offensive
operations near Robotyne and Verbove.[82] Elements of the Russian 38th
Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District) are
reportedly operating near Hulyaipole; elements of the 392nd Motorized
Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit) are operating in the
Zaporizhia direction; and elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Brigade's
70th and 291st motorized rifle regiments are operating east of Robotyne
and in southern Robotyne, respectively.[83]
Positional
engagements continued near Krynky in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on
May 15.[84] A Russian milblogger amplified complaints from a Russian
servicemember reportedly operating on islands in the Dnipro River Delta
about the lack of Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and trained
personnel.[85] Another Russian milblogger amplified a report from a
Russian servicemember reportedly operating near Krynky about how Russian
artillery is accidentally striking Russian forces in friendly fire
incidents.[86]
Ukrainian
forces likely conducted an ATACMS strike on Belbek Airfield in occupied
Crimea on the night of May 14 to 15. Russian sources posted footage
reportedly of the Ukrainian strike on Belbek.[87] Ukrainian journalist
Yuriy Butusov reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a MiG-31
aircraft, two air defense systems, and a radar system and damaged three
Su-27 aircraft at Belbek Airfield.[88] The Russian MoD claimed that
Russian forces shot down 10 ATACMS missiles over Crimea on the night of
May 14 to 15.[89] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev
identified the missiles as the cluster munitions equipped version of the
ATACMS missiles.[90] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that
Ukrainian forces launched up to 16 ATACMS against Belbek Airfield and
that Russian forces downed about 13 missiles.[91]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of limited missile strikes against Ukraine on
May 14 and 15. Kharkiv Oblast Police Chief Volodymyr Tymoshko reported
that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with two S-300 missiles on the
evening of May 14.[92] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian
forces conducted a strike on Mykolaiv City with unspecified missiles on
May 15, and Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated that Russian
forces struck an automotive service station in Mykolaiv.[93] Ukrainian
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Serhiy Lysak reported
that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Dnipro City with an
unspecified number of missiles, and Ukraine's Eastern Air Command
reported that Ukrainian forces shot down a Russian Kh-59/69 cruise
missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[94]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Ukrainian
National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksandr Lytyvyenko
assessed on May 15 that Russian forces will have enough tanks and
armored fighting vehicles for the next year and half of fighting in
Ukraine at their current operational tempo.[95] Russia is relying on
vast Soviet-era stores of vehicles and other equipment to sustain
operations and losses in Ukraine at a level far higher than the current
Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can offset.[96] Russian forces
reportedly removed 25 to 40 percent of its tank strategic reserves,
depending on the model, from open-air storage facilities since 2022 as
of March 2024.[97] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets
reported on February 4 that the Russian defense industry can produce
250–300 “new and thoroughly modernized” tanks per year and can repair
around 250–300 additional damaged tanks per year.[98] The Russian DIB's
constrained ability to produce new tanks and the large but finite number
of Soviet stocks means that there is a limit to the duration of regular
Russian mechanized assaults in Ukraine at the current scale.
Kalashnikov
Concern, a subsidiary of the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate
Rostec, reportedly assumed control over St. Petersburg-based optics
manufacturer JSC Lomo.[99] Kremlin newswire TASS reported on
May 14 that Russian DIB sources stated that JSC Lomo had been
jeopardizing defense orders for years but still produces items that are
extremely important for Russian forces.[100] TASS' sources
reported that Kalashnikov Concern actively uses JSC Lomo's products in
sniper rifles and precision weapons and made the decision to assume
control of JSC Lomo to reduce costs.[101]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts
(Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become
more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international
partners)
Ukrainian defense enterprises continue
to expand domestic production and produce technologically advanced
systems for use on the frontline. The head of Ukraine's state-owned
defense enterprise manager Ukroboronprom, Herman Smetanin, stated on May
8 that Ukroboronprom's production volume has increased by a factor of
three and that the company aims to increase production in some areas up
to 10 times in 2024.[102] Smetanin stated that Ukraine has significantly
increased the production of artillery ammunition and is gradually
moving to the production of 60mmm artillery shells.[103] The Ukrainian
Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on May 11 that it has approved nine
domestically produced land-based robotic systems for operation by
Ukrainian forces and that these systems can conduct combat operations
with small arms, evacuate wounded, and demine areas.[104]
The
US approved the emergency sale of three additional HIMARS systems to
Ukraine for an estimated $30 million on May 10.[105] The US Defense
Security Cooperations Agency and German Defense Minister Boris
Pistorious noted that Germany would be purchasing the HIMARS systems
from the US on Ukraine's behalf.[106] Ukrainian forces have previously
used HIMARS systems to significant effect, particularly contributing to
the Russian withdrawal from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast in
November 2022, and continue to use HIMARS to strike Russian force
concentrations in rear and deep rear areas in occupied Ukraine.[107]
Western
partners continue to pledge air defense assets for Ukraine. Canadian
Defense Minister Bill Blair stated on May 10 that Canada will contribute
$55.7 million to a German-led initiative to provide UA with air defense
systems.[108] The German MoD stated on May 11 that Canada will finance
the purchase of IRIS-T air defense systems for Ukrainian forces.[109]
French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu stated during a hearing at the
national assembly on March 15 that France will send a second batch of
Aster missiles for the SAMP/T air defense system to Ukraine but did not
specify the size or value of the package.[110]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian President Vladimir gave an interview to People's Republic of China (PRC) state outlet Xinhua News Agency
on May 15, in which he promoted the PRC's vague peace plan and
longstanding Kremlin information operations about negotiations.[111] The
Kremlin has routinely feigned interest in meaningful negotiations while
placing the onus for negotiations on the West in an effort to prompt
the West to make concessions on Ukrainian territorial integrity and
sovereignty.[112] Putin likely hopes that these information operations
may generate interest in the PRC's relatively stagnating effort to
portray itself as a credible mediator for the war in Ukraine and set
conditions for negotiations more favorable to Russia.
Kremlin
officials continue to portray the West and the US as seeking to
destabilize Georgia amid continued protests in Tbilisi against Georgia's
Russian-style "foreign agents" bill. White House Press Secretary Karine
Jean-Pierre stated on May 14 that Georgia’s Kremlin-style “foreign
agents” bill would move Georgia further away from the values of the
European Union (EU) and NATO, prompting Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova to accuse the US of "openly
threatening" Georgia.[113] Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili
recently reiterated a series of standard anti-Western and
pseudohistorical Kremlin narratives during his first public speech since
announcing his return to Georgian politics, and both Kremlin actors and
select Georgian officials will likely increasingly malign the West as
attempting to interfere in Georgian affairs amid the ongoing
protests.[114] Members from the ruling Georgian Dream party likely
intend to purposefully derail long-term Georgian efforts for
Euro-Atlantic integration, which plays into continued Russian hybrid
operations to divide, destabilize, and weaken Georgia.[115]
Significant activity in Belarus
(Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and
further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner
Group activity in Belarus)
Belarusian opposition
railway workers stated on May 15 that they have noticed increased
measures to cover up preparations for the movement of Russian military
equipment and personnel between Belarus and Russia.[116] Belarusian
opposition railway workers stated that there has been an increase in
communications between the Russian and Belarusian ministries of defense
(MoD) and Belarusian railway operators but did not confirm that Russian
forces will resume transporting materiel and personnel on Belarusian
railways.[117] Russian forces previously used contingents in Belarus to
leverage Belarusian training capacity and to fix Ukrainian forces to the
Belarusian-Ukrainian border, and the Kremlin may hope to once again
achieve these effects with renewed limited deployments to Belarus.[118]
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/15/prezydent-sylam-oborony-ta-bezpeky-vdalosya-chastkovo-stabilizuvaty-sytuacziyu-na-harkivshhyni/
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/15/syly-oborony-ne-dayut-okupantam-zakripytysya-na-harkivskomu-napryamku/
[2] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/05/15/syly-oborony-ne-dayut-okupantam-zakripytysya-na-harkivskomu-napryamku/
[3]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/15/3agynulo-chetvero-budivelnykiv-30-odynycz-tehniky-znyshheno-vorogom-v-harkivskij-ova-prozvituvaly-pro-vykonani-fortyfikaczijni-roboty/
[4] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051424
[5] https://twitter.com/HelsinkiComm/status/1790833494450421919
[6]
https://www.ukrinform dot
ua/rubric-polytics/3864070-ssa-ne-zaohocuut-udari-po-teritorii-rosii-ale-ukraina-mae-sama-virisuvati-blinken.html
;
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-ukrainian-foreign-minister-dmytro-kuleba-at-a-joint-press-availability-5/
[7] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/14/ukraine-weapons-russia-00157970
[8]
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias
[9] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putins-safe-space-defeating-russias-kharkiv-operation-requires-eliminating-russias
[10] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74030
[11]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/unclassified_2024_ata_report_0.pdf
[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2024
[13] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/us/politics/russia-momentum-ukraine-war.html
[14] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/us/politics/russia-momentum-ukraine-war.html
[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-11-2024
[16] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74030 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74036
[17] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/20808705 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74036
[18] http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74030
[19] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2023
[20] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74030
[21]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2023-0
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041524
[23]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-16-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2024
[24]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar011024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010724 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar012524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar030724
[25] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74036 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74030
[26]
https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/european-arms-imports-nearly-double-us-and-french-exports-rise-and-russian-exports-fall-sharply#:~:text=aircraft%20outside%20Europe.-,',to%20only%2012%20in%202023.
[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724
[28] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6129
[29] http://kremlin dot ru/supplement/6129
[30]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar050624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 ;
https://t.me/arbat/1811 ; https://t.me/arbat/1812 ;
https://t.me/arbat/1813
[31] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050324 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-2-2024
[32] https://t.me/rybar/60068 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042424
[33]
https://telegra dot ph/Tatuinskie-hroniki-05-14 ;
https://t.me/Mestb_Dobroj_Voli/11213 ; https://t.me/rybar/60070 ;
https://t.me/rybar/60070 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42627
[34]
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-ukrainian-foreign-minister-dmytro-kuleba-at-a-joint-press-availability-5/
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/15/ssha-nadadut-2-mlrd-u-noviy-fond-iz-rozvytku-oboronno-promyslovogo-kompleksu-ukrayiny/
; https://www.facebook.com/UkraineMFA/videos/1000415285031784/
[35] https://suspilne dot media/746127-droni-gur-atakuvali-palivnu-bazu-u-rostovskij-oblasti-dzerela/ ;
[36] https://suspilne dot media/746127-droni-gur-atakuvali-palivnu-bazu-u-rostovskij-oblasti-dzerela
[37] https://suspilne dot media/746127-droni-gur-atakuvali-palivnu-bazu-u-rostovskij-oblasti-dzerela/
[38] https://t.me/golubev_vu/1337
[39] https://zona dot media/article/2024/05/15/wanted-may
[40] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050424
[41]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4-2024
; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031224
[42] https://t.me/ua_42nd_ombr/276; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5535 (Hlyboke)
https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/8294;
https://x.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1790797039720075668;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5538 (Travyanske Reservoir)
[43]
https://t.me/mod_russia/38776 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42619 ;
https://t.me/rybar/60078 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26812 ;
https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/10471
[44] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1865
[45] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/745473-sist-sil-lipeckoi-gromadi-okupuvali-rosiani-skilki-ludej-tam-perebuvaut/
[46] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
[47] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/288; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5524
[48] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10673 ; https://t.me/rybar/60078 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68174
[49] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/05/15/na-pidhodah-ta-u-samomu-vovchansku-okupanty-gynut-u-velykij-kilkosti-rechnyk-mou/
[50] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/746121-u-vovcansku-15-travna-lisautsa-do-300-ludej-geografia-boiv-ne-zminilasa-mva/
[51] https://www.pravda dot com.ua/rus/news/2024/05/15/7455860/
[52]
https://t.me/rybar/60063 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42606 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/42619 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10688;
https://t.me/dva_majors/42615 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19934 ;
https://t.me/rusich_army/14646 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/26811 ;
https://t.me/z_arhiv/26812 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68174
[53]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09XRXgQ8WbSkPwHxW2kPmusmvmvGt9QW21bpsAfk76JMENUjmRru1Ew1UyvYwXKE4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xwDyHPLnRUR8Vzos1KtWFDBBvVcsDLHsYNCTTnaogvCGaCeEyS8xmvTtHNze3Z13l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
; https://t.me/mod_russia/38776
[54] https://t.me/motopatriot/22882
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10679
[56] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68189
[57]
https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1790460663308992969;
https://twitter.com/foosint/status/1790460678156829143;
https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/163778
[58]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09XRXgQ8WbSkPwHxW2kPmusmvmvGt9QW21bpsAfk76JMENUjmRru1Ew1UyvYwXKE4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xwDyHPLnRUR8Vzos1KtWFDBBvVcsDLHsYNCTTnaogvCGaCeEyS8xmvTtHNze3Z13l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
[59] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/123665
[60] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10682
[61] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/35988 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/14654 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/248929
[62]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09XRXgQ8WbSkPwHxW2kPmusmvmvGt9QW21bpsAfk76JMENUjmRru1Ew1UyvYwXKE4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
; https://t.me/rybar/60063 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10685 ;
https://t.me/wargonzo/19934 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22882 ;
https://t.me/rusich_army/14654
[63] https://t.me/rusich_army/14654
[64]
https://t.me/rybar/60063 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/42604 ;
https://t.me/dva_majors/42619 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10687 ;
https://t.me/wargonzo/19934 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/17188 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56256
[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56256
[66]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09XRXgQ8WbSkPwHxW2kPmusmvmvGt9QW21bpsAfk76JMENUjmRru1Ew1UyvYwXKE4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xwDyHPLnRUR8Vzos1KtWFDBBvVcsDLHsYNCTTnaogvCGaCeEyS8xmvTtHNze3Z13l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
; https://t.me/mod_russia/38776 ; https://t.me/rybar/60063 ;
https://t.me/motopatriot/22929 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/123652 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56254 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56256
[67] https://t.me/dva_majors/42676
[68]
https://www.facebook.com/100068564836091/posts/pfbid0AzcCGUpiiuJGrVeQBxttMwDofWbAwHx4dVi1Hg4KZSTs7J6wWafVNuxswnqufW4ol/?app=fbl;
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/14886;
https://twitter.com/blinzka/status/1790661992111300707
[69] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/10296 ; https://t.me/odshbr79/192 ; https://x.com/666_mancer/status/1790624941034918054
[70] https://t.me/motopatriot/22904 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56256
[71]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09XRXgQ8WbSkPwHxW2kPmusmvmvGt9QW21bpsAfk76JMENUjmRru1Ew1UyvYwXKE4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xwDyHPLnRUR8Vzos1KtWFDBBvVcsDLHsYNCTTnaogvCGaCeEyS8xmvTtHNze3Z13l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
; https://t.me/rybar/60063 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19934 ;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/56256
[72] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68190 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/68190 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/12208
[73] https://t.me/osirskiy/691; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/5527; https://twitter.com/mon_mon_1064552/status/1790691704607293479
[74]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xwDyHPLnRUR8Vzos1KtWFDBBvVcsDLHsYNCTTnaogvCGaCeEyS8xmvTtHNze3Z13l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0S1zffZrUBbMxZeqtYJd5o3nFX5mDpoQ6W54DXdRCcFzWqNz9NvUCw5cQVDC5cnGWl
; https://t.me/dva_majors/42619 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/248999
[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/8563
[76] https://t.me/mod_russia/38777
[77] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/05/15/rechnyk-syl-oborony-pivdnya-prokomentuvav-sytuacziyu-v-robotynomu/ ;
[78] https://t.me/motopatriot/22905
[79] https://t.me/motopatriot/22933
[80] https://t.me/dva_majors/42654 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10684
[81] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/10665
[82]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09XRXgQ8WbSkPwHxW2kPmusmvmvGt9QW21bpsAfk76JMENUjmRru1Ew1UyvYwXKE4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02xwDyHPLnRUR8Vzos1KtWFDBBvVcsDLHsYNCTTnaogvCGaCeEyS8xmvTtHNze3Z13l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0S1zffZrUBbMxZeqtYJd5o3nFX5mDpoQ6W54DXdRCcFzWqNz9NvUCw5cQVDC5cnGWl
; https://t.me/wargonzo/19934
[83] https://t.me/dva_majors/42599 ; https://t.me/motopatriot/22919
[84]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09XRXgQ8WbSkPwHxW2kPmusmvmvGt9QW21bpsAfk76JMENUjmRru1Ew1UyvYwXKE4l
;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02iaVoQ3VFc4d9opeSLxJCHCCXLiTV9jLqrjqg3TgBNZTEzpDJAPNNn25FVY31USyzl
;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid0S1zffZrUBbMxZeqtYJd5o3nFX5mDpoQ6W54DXdRCcFzWqNz9NvUCw5cQVDC5cnGWl
[85] https://t.me/dva_majors/42663
[86] https://t.me/philologist_zov/972
[87] https://t.me/dva_majors/42656 ; https://t.me/vanek_nikolaev/23557 ; https://t.me/astrapress/55484;
[88] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/10303
[89] Oblast https://t.me/mod_russia/38768
[90] https://t.me/razvozhaev/6406 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/6409
[91] https://t.me/rybar/60073
[92] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/745835-rosijska-armia-vdarila-s-300-po-harkovu-vveceri-14-travna-naslidki-vlucanna/
[93]
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02gMX6sTWKMufB8QGcqMXaeL65Y8pmK1a4ejdSwi8m77vtfYKaGRdVyWBRCgzbryRYl
; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/9142
[94] https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/15/vorog-atakuvav-dnipro-2-zagyblyh-poshkodzheno-infrastrukturu/
;
https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid0BLvMUBCoQFnUs2jFtyJFfeXw7xCRDUthyuVpJzBkpym5spxUcGHoVYtwed9p1hTFl
[95] https://www.facebook.com/rnbou/posts/pfbid02ucFTsGj1zVbZaGkgFKZqG4JKmD2c8CUZK5Mc32SFrjqerSEXWLwNdvDP4jknoD6il
[96] https://isw.pub/UkrWar050824
[97] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031124
[98] https://isw.pub/UkrWar040524
[99] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20797333 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/122222
[100] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20797333 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/122222
[101] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/20797333
[102]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/08/ukrayina-suttyevo-narostyla-vyrobnycztvo-boyeprypasiv-intervyu-armiyainform-z-gendyrektorom-at-ukroboronprom/
[103]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/08/ukrayina-suttyevo-narostyla-vyrobnycztvo-boyeprypasiv-intervyu-armiyainform-z-gendyrektorom-at-ukroboronprom/
[104]
https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=764155462563575&id=100069073844828&mibextid=ox5AEW&rdid=sKAQjUuT5hXw4ogH
[105] https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems
[106]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2024/05/09/nimechchyna-kupyt-dlya-ukrayiny-try-puskovi-himars/;
https://www.t-online dot
de/nachrichten/ukraine/id_100400494/ukraine-krieg-pistorius-will-himars-raketenwerfer-an-ukraine-liefern.html
;
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems
[107]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2024
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Feb%203%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf
;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2023
[108]
https://www.reuters.com/world/canada-give-c76-million-help-buy-air-defenses-ukraine-2024-05-10/
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2024/05/10/kanada-nadast-majzhe-56-mln-na-posylennya-ukrayinskoyi-ppo/
[109]
https://www.bmvg dot
de/de/aktuelles/kanada-52-millionen-ukrainische-luftverteidigung-5781836
; https://mil dot
in.ua/uk/news/ukrayina-otrymaye-dodatkovi-rakety-dlya-iris-t/
[110]
https://www.lemonde dot
fr/international/live/2024/05/15/en-direct-guerre-en-ukraine-paris-va-livrer-un-lot-de-missiles-a-l-ukraine_6232695_3210.html?#id-1507698
[111] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/74027 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/248904 ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/40571
[112]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar040424 ;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar021424%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar030224%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar012624%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar020824%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar012224%C2%A0;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-3-2024
[113]
https://t.me/tass_agency/248928 ;
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2024/05/14/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-karine-jean-pierre-and-united-states-trade-representative-katherine-tai/
[114]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar043024 ;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2024
[115] https://isw.pub/UkrWar051424
[116]
https://t.me/Hajun_BY/7883; https://t.me/belzhd_live/2442 ;
https://belzhd dot
link/military-transportation/bzhd-snova-gotovitsya-k-priemu-rossijskih-voinskih-eshelonov/
[117]
https://t.me/Hajun_BY/7883; https://t.me/belzhd_live/2442 ;
https://belzhd dot
link/military-transportation/bzhd-snova-gotovitsya-k-priemu-rossijskih-voinskih-eshelonov/
[118] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11
